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Abstract: Attitudes towards EU integration are widely studied. Yet, we only know little 
about the role of personality for EU attitudes. Utilising a framing experiment, 
encompassing positive and negative frames of EU integration, this article reports on how 
personality influences attitudes towards EU integration, and how personal 
predispositions moderate framing effects, impacting EU attitude formation. The study 
relies on Danish and Swedish data (N=1808). I test both the direct impact of personality 
on EU attitudes, and personality’s moderating impact on framing effects. I find that 
extraversion and openness positively correlate with positive EU attitudes, while people 
scoring high on neuroticism tend to support the EU less. Furthermore, I find that 
personality moderates different EU frames. Individuals with certain personality traits are 
more influenced by framing effects than others, while positive and negative frames also 
are perceived differently according to personal predisposition. I find only little country 
differences between Denmark and Sweden. 
 
Introduction 
Attitudes towards the EU integration are intensively studied. Consequently, we have 
extensive insights into the mechanisms that drive attitudes towards the EU (e.g., 
Anderson, 1998, McLaren, 2007, Karp et al., 2003, Usherwood and Startin, 2013). 
However, little attention is devoted to the psychology of EU attitudes. Although political 
psychology has risen to stardom recently, it has barely entered the realm of EU studies 
(for more on psychology and EU studies see Manners, 2014). The psychological branch 
of political science shows how personality explains, for example, attitudes and ideology 
(e.g., Mondak and Halperin, 2008, Gerber et al., 2011), and relates to political news 
attentiveness, knowledge, and efficacy (e.g., Mondak, 2010). These dimensions are 
salient in an EU context to make politics work.     
This article bridges the gap between explorations into the role of personal 
predispositions for attitude formation and the work on attitudes towards EU integration. It 
explores the direct effect of personality on EU attitudes and how different EU frames 
moderate the effect of personality on EU attitudes. This latter focus provides a more 
realistic picture of how personal predispositions moderate framing effects in real life. As 
emphasised elsewhere, personality should be understood in the context in which it 
operates as the effect of different political frames, for example, is contingent upon 
individual level characteristics (Mondak et al., 2010, Mondak, 2010). Political attitudes 
are partly determined by personality traits. Thus, the complexity of personality traits and 
their political role is best appreciated as an interactive relationship (Mondak, 2010, p. 
110).  
This research is timely. We know that personality determines individuals’ attitude 
formation and political behaviour (e.g., Schoen, 2007, Gerber et al., 2010, Gerber et al., 
2011); more than ever, it is important to grasp what determines EU attitude. Although 
Euroscepticism has been researched in past decades (e.g., Hobolt, 2009), the events of the 
Eurozone crisis accelerated the debate about EU integration, linking the crisis to the study 
of Euroscepticism (e.g., Usherwood and Startin, 2013). Encompassing a new explanation 
of EU attitude formation, this article provides insights into how people navigate 
contemporary European politics. Furthermore, recent studies on framing effects show that 
the framing of political messages does indeed affect attitudes towards European 
integration (e.g., Lecheler and Vreese, 2010). This study builds on these findings.  
To measure personality, I apply the most commonly used personality instrument 
the Big Five personality instrument (henceforth B5) – encompassing five personality 
traits: extraversion, openness, agreeableness, consciousness and neuroticism (e.g., Costa 
and McCrae, 2009). Using the 10-item battery, I report on a survey experiment with six 
different EU frames on a representative subset of the Danish and Swedish populations 
(N=1808). Hence, I test both the direct effect of personal predispositions on EU attitudes, 
and the moderating effect of B5 traits on EU attitudes, depending on the framing 
treatment.   
 
EU attitudes and the role of personality 
Although political theories of opinion formation emphasize the importance of individual 
predispositions (Zaller, 1992, Converse, 1964), the theoretical link between personality 
and politics is underdeveloped (e.g., Greenstein, 1971, Mondak, 2010).  
The pioneering work of Mondak (2010) manifested that personality affects political 
information, knowledge, discussion-eagerness, ideology and participation (Mondak, 
2010). Following his work, we now know that B5 traits explain attitude formation on 
salient policy fields, such as immigration (Gerber et al., 2010, Gerber et al., 2011), 
foreign policy (Schoen, 2007), presidential performance (Rubenzer et al., 2000), and 
voting behaviour (Schoen and Schumann, 2007). Furthermore, B5 traits explain patterns 
of political discussion (Hibbing et al., 2011) and predict social worldviews and ideology 
(Sibley and Duckitt, 2009).  
Although Euroscepticism has been an increasingly explored field (e.g., 
Usherwood and Startin, 2013), the pertinent role of personality as an explanation has 
hitherto been largely ignored. From the voluminous amount of research, we possess 
extensive insights into EU attitudes formation. Opinions are largely formed based on 
domestic politics (Anderson, 1998), although politically aware individuals evaluate EU 
politics independently from national politics (Karp et al., 2003, McLaren, 2007). 
Economic calculations (Karp et al., 2003) and egocentric utilitarianism play a role in EU 
support (McLaren, 2007). Others argue that community identity is stronger than 
economic calculus when explaining EU attitudes (Hooghe and Marks, 2005), in which 
the strength of partisan context (Gabel, 1998), national identity and democratic concerns 
also influence EU views (Gabel and Hix, 2005). Furthermore, feelings of a lack of 
representation affect support for the European enterprise (Rohrschneider, 2002)..  
To my knowledge, only one recent study on the effect of B5 traits on EU attitudes 
exists (Bakker et al., 2015). Exploring five dimensions of EU attitudes as an outcome 
variable (i.e., support for widening and deepening the EU; trust in the EU; identification 
of the EU and negative experience of the EU), the study concludes that B5 traits are the 
antecedent of a diverse set of EU attitudes. I rely on these results later, when deducing 
my hypotheses. However, Bakker et al. do not explore how personality moderates, for 
example, framing effects when exposed to EU news. Furthermore, the study includes 
only Dutch data. My article explores whether the direct effect of personality on EU 
attitudes is robust across countries and contextualizes the study, exploring the moderating 
effect of personality traits on framing effects. It does so because it has been shown 
strongly elsewhere that the expression of personality effects are typically situational 
(Mondak et al., 2010, p. 87).  
Studies of media framing effects show that contextual news frames or campaign 
ads shape perceptions of politics (e.g., Slothuus and Vreese, 2010, Druckman, 2001a, 
Druckman et al., 2011). Zaller famously noted that personal predispositions shape 
responses to context stimuli (Zaller, 1992), causing Chong and Druckman (2007) to 
suggest a psychological model for understanding the effect of framing effects (Chong and 
Druckman, 2007b).  
A number of studies identify moderating variables that condition framing effects. 
These variables include, in particular, individual predispositions, such as political values 
(e.g, Slothuus, 2008), whereas some find political knowledge conditions framing effects 
(For more here see Chong and Druckman, 2007b). Other psychological moderators on 
framing effects include cultural values (e.g., Chong, 2000). Chong and Druckman (2007) 
argue that strong predispositions reduce framing effects by increasing resistance to 
disconfirming information (Chong and Druckman, 2007b, pp. 112). Hence, we can 
expect that framing effects are not moderated only by individual-level predispositions. 
The strength to which the frames are moderated depends on the intensity of particular 
individual-level predispositions. This way I expect a situational heterogeneous effect of 
personality traits when exposed to similar frames (Mondak et al, 2010: 90).  
Anti-EU media framing discourse contributes to embedded Euroscepticism (e.g., 
Usherwood and Startin, 2013, p. 10, Lecheler and Vreese, 2010). For example, frames 
stressing the risks associated with EU integration make individuals less likely to support 
EU integration (Schuck and de Vreese, 2006). An experiment framing the EU as a 
”cultural threat” or emphasizing its ”democratic deficit” shows that both frames lead to 
less EU support (Abbarno and Zapryanova, 2013). Furthermore, exposure to different 
news frames affects the understanding of EU enlargement (Lecheler and Vreese, 2010). 
Finally, media evaluation of the EU affected Eurosceptic voting in the 2009 European 
Parliament election (Spanje and Vreese, 2014).  
In summary, we know that personality matters for political attitude formation. We 
know that political attitudes are pliable according to personal predispositions, but they are 
also formed based on media framing. This study builds on these findings when deducing 
the hypotheses in the next section.  
 
How personality relates to EU attitudes  
Here, I present hypotheses about how B5 traits are expected to relate to EU attitudes and, 
more specifically, how negative and positive EU frames may moderate these 
relationships. Importantly, personality traits are not understood as determining political 
attitudes. Rather, personality – along with a set of factors – shapes responses to the 
stimuli individuals encounter (e.g., Mondak, 2010).  
I rely on previous empirical conclusions to develop the hypotheses. For each of 
the five character traits, I make predictions about both the direct effect on EU attitudes 
and the indirect effect in conjunction with the framing effects. I state expectations about 
both whether a personality trait is more prone to be influenced by frames, in general, and 
whether the positive or negative frames may affect a particular trait more.  
 
The EU framing treatments introduced in a later section encompass positive and negative 
aspects of EU integration. We know that negative and positive political frames are 
received asymmetrically. Negative frames – ceteris paribus – affect people’s attitudes 
towards a particular policy field more than positive frames do (e.g., Soroka, 2006, Ito et 
al., 1998, Rozin and Royzman, 2001). Hence, I expect negative frames to have a stronger 
moderating effect on all personality traits on EU attitudes than positive frames.  
 H1: Negative frames affect EU opinions more strongly than positive frames.  
 
I expect that extraversion is positively related to EU attitudes. Extraversion is 
measured by the respondents’ self-placement on two items: (1) extraverted and 
enthusiastic, and (2) reserved, quiet. Extraverted people are more politically involved. 
They are prone to seek new information and challenge old beliefs, and they are more 
adaptable. Previous research finds that extraverts tune more into news and are more 
opinionated, outgoing and interactive with political society (Mondak, 2010, pp. 57, 119). 
Since extraverted individuals are more adaptable to political changes, I expect, in line 
with Bakker and Vreese (2015) that extraverted individuals are more inclined to support 
the ever-changing nature of the EU.  
 H2a: Extraversion positively correlates with positive EU attitudes.  
 
I expect highly extraverted individuals to be more easily influenced by news framing 
because they are more frequently exposed to news and participate more in political 
discussions (e.g., Mondak, 2010). Furthermore, following H2a, I expect highly 
extraverted individuals to react more strongly to positive frames. Research on cross-
cutting opinion exchanges show that individuals tend to seek opinions already in line 
with their understanding of the world (e.g., Mutz, 2006). Furthermore, we know that 
strong predispositions reduce framing effects by increasing resistance to disconfirming 
information (Chong and Druckman, 2007b, pp. 112). Hence, I expect the following:  
H2b: Extraverted individuals are more easily influenced by framing effects, particularly 
positive frames.  
 
I expect neuroticism to correlate negatively with the wish for more EU integration. 
Neuroticism (also Emotional stability) is tapped by the two items: (1) anxious and easily 
upset and (2) calm and emotionally stable. Neurotic individuals are easily upset by 
changes and instability (Mondak, 2010, pp. 61, 63). The EU is characterized by 
institutional instability and change, affecting identity creation (e.g., Cram, 2009). 
Knowing that identity is a strong predictor explaining EU attitudes (e.g., Hooghe and 
Marks, 2005, Gabel and Hix, 2005) and that identity affects personality, I expect neurotic 
people to be less susceptible to EU identity adaptation. Consequently, they support EU 
integration less. This assumption finds support in recent research showing that 
neuroticism negatively affects affect towards the EU (Bakker et al., 2015, p. 10). 
 H3a: Neuroticism inversely correlates with positive EU attitudes.  
 
Research finds evidence for less media use by neurotic individuals (Mondak, 2010, p. 
96). Hence, I expect neurotic individuals to be less susceptible for news framing in 
general. Furthermore, as argued above, research shows that individuals are biased to seek 
out information supporting their a priori views (Mutz, 2006), and particularly receptive to 
frames supporting their view (Chong and Druckman, 2007a). Hence, following H3a, I 
expect highly neurotic individuals to be more susceptible to negative EU news frames. 
H3b: Neurotic individuals are less easily influenced on their EU attitudes. When 
influenced, they are more susceptible to negative frames.  
 
 I expect a positive relationship between openness to experience (henceforth 
openness) and EU support. The two items captured by openness are the respondents’ self-
placement on (1) open to new experiences, possess many different sides and (2) 
traditional, not particularly creative. Openness is associated with the ability to adapt to 
new political institutions, being attracted to new experiences. Open individuals like 
exposure to different cultures and are more politically aware (Mondak, 2010, pp. 48,50). 
European integration is characterized by new governance structures and the integration of 
difference cultures. Furthermore, openness is positively associated with support for the 
widening of the EU in the Netherlands (Bakker and Vreese, 2015, p. 9).  
 H4a: Openness positively correlates with positive EU attitudes.  
 
Because openness is associated with an intrinsic attraction to new experiences and 
openness to media news and opinion changes, I expect open individuals to be more 
influenced by news frames, in general. Furthermore, following H4a, I expect highly open 
individuals to be more prone to react to positive frames. As emphasized above, strong 
predispositions increase resilience to alternative arguments (e.g., Mutz, 2006), 
encompassing framing effects with contrasting information (Chong and Druckman, 
2007b, pp. 112).  
H4b: Open individuals are more easily influenced by EU media frames, 
particularly positive frames.  
 I expect a positive relationship between conscientiousness and EU support. The 
two items capturing conscientiousness are the respondents’ self-placement on (1) 
dependable and self-disciplined, and (2) disorganized and careless. Conscientiousness is 
associated with dependability and reliability. Conscientious individuals favour the status 
quo and are more traditional and politically conservative (Mondak, 2010, pp. 51,54). We 
have mixed findings about conscientiousness. Schoen (2007) finds that highly 
conscientious Germans express less preference for international cooperation (Schoen, 
2007). However, Bakker and Vreese (2015) conclude that conscientiousness positively 
predicts support for deepening the EU and trust in the EU. Hence, I expect the following:  
H5a: Conscientiousness positively correlates with positive EU attitudes. 
 
Highly conscientious individuals have a low level of political knowledge, and they strive 
to maintain homogeneity in their social network to avoid exposure to disagreement 
(Mondak, 2010, pp. 111, 116). Hence, I expect them to be less influenced by EU frames 
in general. Conscientious individuals have shown less political interest, have a low level 
of knowledge, and prefer non-conflictual opinion-exchanges in heterogeneous networks. 
Therefore, following H5a, I expect framing effects, when influential, to be strongest for 
positive frames.  
H5b: Conscientious individuals are less influenced by EU frames. When influenced, they 
are susceptible to positive frames.  
 
Finally, I expect that agreeable individuals are more supporting of the EU. The two items 
capturing agreeableness are the respondents’ self-placement on (1) argumentative and 
critical and (2) sympathetic and warm. Agreeableness is associated with dependability 
and high degrees of reliability. Agreeable individuals desire positive relations with 
others, and they tend to avoid conflicts (Mondak, 2010, pp. 58). Mixed evidence exists 
concerning the effect of agreeableness on political attitudes (Mondak, 2010, pp. 60). 
However, in a European context, agreeable Germans support international cooperation 
(Schoen, 2007), whereas agreeable Dutchmen support widening of the EU (Bakker and 
Vreese, 2015, pp. 9). Hence, I predict the following relationship:  
H6a: Agreeableness positively correlates with EU attitudes.  
 
Highly agreeable individuals tend to prefer less conflict exposure and thrive in 
homogeneous societal groups (Mondak, 2010). However, we also know that individuals 
scoring high on agreeableness tend to be more positive towards international cooperation 
(Schoen, 2007) and the EU (Bakker and Vreese, 2015). Consequently, I have no a priori 
expectations about whether agreeable individuals are more or less prone to obtain media 
frames. Following H6a, I expect highly agreeable individuals to be more susceptible to 
positive frames.  
H6b: Agreeable individuals are more influenced by positive EU frames.  
 
Cases  
Denmark and Sweden are excellent cases to study Euroscepticism. It was the Danish “no” 
vote on the Maastricht Treaty (1992) that sparked the discussions about popular 
Euroscepticism (e.g., Hobolt, 2009, Hobolt, 2012, Franklin et al., 1995, Lawler, 1997). 
Later, both countries rejected full Euro membership (e.g., Jupille and Leblang, 2007). 
Today, Denmark maintains three opt-outs of salient EU areas. Euroscepticism is a 
persistent phenomenon in both countries (e.g., Usherwood and Startin, 2013). It was 
organized in Denmark during early EC membership in 1972. Sweden joined the Union in 
1995 and only recently witnessed party-based Euroscepticism. Both countries have strong 
Eurosceptic parties (Raunio, 2007). 
The Danes and Swedes are best characterized as soft Eurosceptics (e.g., Raunio, 
2007). They are devoted European pragmatists (e.g., Schuck and Vreese, 2013, Knudsen, 
2008), a fact highlighted consistently by Eurobarometer data, showing strong support for 
EU membership, even in times of crisis (Author’s own work, forthcoming). Recently, 
Euroscepticism has been tied to the evolution of the EMU (Usherwood and Startin, 2013, 
Hobolt and Leblond, 2014, Ioannou et al., 2015), resulting in the overwhelming success 
of Eurosceptic parties in the latest European Parliament election (2014). Additionally, 
Denmark and Sweden witnessed increased Euroscepticism in the recent national elections 
(Author’s own work).  
Denmark and Sweden resemble each other in many ways. They are both universal 
welfare states, encompassing high levels of social capital, political legitimacy and trust 
(e.g., Rothstein and Eek, 2006, Rothstein and Stolle, 2008, Gilley, 2006). Being high 
redistribution societies, I expect personal predispositions such as altruism (i.e., a sub-
concept under agreeableness) to be high. Furthermore, I expect individuals to score 
highly on openness and extraversion, correlating strongly with trust (e.g., Freitag and 
Ackermann, 2015). These perspectives may affect the generalizability of the results.  
Much of Scandinavian Euroscepticism centres around the welfare state (Raunio, 
2007, p. 204-205). However, welfare does not account for identification alone. At the 
heart of the Scandinavian worldview lies a positive model of the internationalist state 
(Lawler, 1997, p. 568). Here, Sweden is famously known for adopting neutrality. 
Denmark, in contrast, maintains foreign policy activism (Lawler, 1997, pp. 568-569).  
There are many similarities between the two countries. I replicate the study 
primarily to explore the robustness of the results. Cross-country similarities and 
differences concerning the effect of personality trait on political vote choice have been 
found in earlier studies (Vecchione et al., 2011). Vecchione et al. included a set of 
heterogeneous countries, whereas this present study includes two homogeneous cases.  
H7a: There are no significant differences between Denmark and Sweden encompassing 
the direct or indirect effect of personality on EU attitudes.  
 
 
A survey experiment on the role of personality in EU attitudes  
I use data from a survey experiment. Based on a media content analysis in Denmark and 
Sweden encompassing all broadsheet national newspapers between 2008 and 2013, I 
deduce 6 EU news frames, anchoring the frames in contemporary news (Author’s own 
work). These frames are so-called emphasis frames, emphasizing certain EU aspects (e.g., 
Druckman, 2001b). The first negative frame (Greece) presents the commonly depicted 
stereotype of the “hardworking German” vis-à-vis the “lazy Greek”. The second 
(Welfare) emphasizes the negative aspects of welfare tourism, whereas the last frame 
(Negative Culture) focuses on the differences in political culture between the scandalous 
and corrupt Mediterranean culture vis-à-vis the less corrupt and scandalous Northern 
political culture. Each frame is asked on an interval measure. The frame variables are 
included as a dummy in the analysis (i.e., whether subjects received the particular frame). 
 The first positive frame (Peace) emphasizes the peacekeeping mission of the EU, 
highlighting its receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize (2012). The second positive frame 
highlights the common European culture aspect (Positive Culture), whereas the last 
(Economy) highlights the economic benefits of the EU, stressing its ability to compete 
against global economies. All negative and positive frames emphasize aspects of the Euro 
Crisis. Using the same policy content but highlighting different pro and con arguments, I 
expect stronger treatment effects because these aspects were salient in 2013, and the Euro 
constitutes a symbolic creation of a European polity, affecting individual identity creation 
(e.g., Cram, 2009).  
 Importantly, this study does not report on the framing effects per se. Rather, the 
frames serve as a more realistic exploration of B5 traits’ explanatory power on EU 
attitudes because we cannot expect personal predispositions to occur in a vacuum. Rather, 
they are triggered by contextual circumstances (e.g., Mondak and Halperin, 2008, Gerber 
et al., 2010). Because the frames are built on frequently used news frames, the findings 
can be generalized to real-world politics, although I do not imply that I have covered all 
possible EU news frames. However, the realistic setting here imposed by randomly 
assigning frames that are deduced from actual news reporting provides a crucial stepping-
stone, assessing the role of personality traits in real-world politics.  
 Most studies on psychological traits use the B5 framework. (e.g., Mondak, 2010, 
Mondak and Halperin, 2008, Gerber et al., 2010). The B5 traits consist of a hierarchical 
model with five broad factors. Each factor has a bipolar counterpart, and each 
summarizes several sub-factors. The B5 traits are captured with different instruments, 
ranging from the extensive 60-item NEO-Five Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI) (e.g., McCrae 
and Costa jr, 1999, Mondak, 2010, Mondak and Halperin, 2008, Costa and McCrae, 
2009) to the less extensive 5-10 item instruments developed based on comprehensive 
schemes (Gosling et al., 2003). I use the 10-item instrument. Although there are trade-
offs in using a less extensive instrument that may compromise nuances and accurateness, 
benefits are also obtained. Most importantly, a less comprehensive instrument ensures 
that respondents do not leave the survey prematurely (e.g., Carney et al., 2008, Gerber et 
al., 2010). The Gosling et al. 10-item instrument is thoroughly tested and widely used 
(Muck et al., 2007).  
 
Research design and data  
I report on a survey experiment in Denmark and Sweden (N=904 for each country). Data 
are collected as a web survey encompassing a representative set of the population based 
on age, gender and education because these attributes repeatedly show an effect on 
attitude formation (e.g., Schoen, 2007 pp. 409). The survey was conducted by YouGov 
and fielded in October 2013.  
 The six different frames were randomly assigned to a sub-set of respondents 
(N=100 for each frame). The survey employed a between-subject design, in which each 
respondent received only one of the six frames or was allocated into the non-treated 
control group (N=300 in each country). The strength of this experimental design is that it 
induces exogenous situational variation, allowing us to measure how personality 
moderates the framing effect while holding everything else constant. The framing 
treatments free us from relying on self-reported interpretation of situational stimuli, 
which can be influenced by personality traits (e.g., Druckman et al., 2011).  
Table 11 provides the descriptive statistics (see online appendix). As seen, the 
randomization maintained gender balance and age (and education, which is not included 
in the analysis). Also the respondent’s self-placement on a traditional left-right political 
scale (0=left and 10=right) is balanced.  
     
Descriptive statistics and models   
The dependent variable is attitude towards EU integration. I use the standard item found 
in the European Social Survey, measuring EU attitude on an interval scale; “Some say 
European unification should go further. Others say it has already gone too far. From a 
scale from 0-10 where 0 represents “integration has gone too far” and 10 “integration 
should go further”, what number on the scale best describes your position?” The 
dependent variable was tapped after the framing treatments. See Table 22 for the 
distribution of answers for the framing questions.  
Each personality trait consists of four concepts divided into two items 
representing each end of a bipolar scale. The mean of self-placement on each item is 
found in Table 3. The distribution of answers does not significantly differ between 
Denmark and Sweden. To maintain the bipolar scale dimension, each personality trait is 
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coded between -6 to 6, where 6 is ranking very high on the particular trait, and -6 is 
scoring very low. 
 
     (Table 3)  
 
I test three models using OLS regression estimation. Model 1 reports the effect of 
B5 traits on EU attitudes. Model 2 tests the direct and moderating effect of country on the 
relationship between personality and EU attitudes. Finally, Model 3 adds the framing 
treatments as controls and explores the frames’ moderating effect on the relationship 
between personality and EU attitudes. Model 3 also includes gender, age and voting 
behaviour as controls because these attributes have shown significant effect in previous 
studies (Schmitt et al., 2008, pp. 142, Mondak, 2010, pp. 162). Finally, I include 
respondents’ self-placement on a political left-right scale because previous studies show 
that personality strongly determines ideology (Mondak, 2010, pp. 128).  
 
Results  
Table 4 provides the results. Model 1 shows that none of the personality traits 
significantly affects EU attitudes. However, both extraversion and openness have the 
hypothesized positive relationship with EU attitudes. Although not significant, the 
relationship is nevertheless consistent across the three models. Furthermore, as expected, 
neuroticism is consistently inversely related to EU support. This relationship is 
significant (p<0.1) in Model 3. Conscientiousness and agreeableness, however, show 
both positive and negative correlations with EU attitudes (Model 1-3). Although I 
identify only one significant relationship between the B5 traits and EU attitudes, we 
nevertheless observe the predicted correlational relationships from H2a, H3a, and H4a, 
whereas H5a and H6a are only partly verified because results are diverging.  
 
     (Table 4 – the full models are in Table 4 online appendix in final printed version) 
 
Model 2 reports the country findings. As expected in H7a, there are no significant 
differences between the two countries, either when country is included as a control or as 
an interaction with personality traits. Model 3 includes the frames, and each frame 
interacted with each personality trait. Furthermore, the model includes the controls. 
Interestingly, no gender effect is found, contrasting with previous research, in which 
women are less EU-positive than men (e.g., Pepermans and Verleye, 1998). None of the 
controls significantly affects EU attitudes.  
 Model 3 shows that the framing effects affect subjects in the hypothesized 
directions. The negative Greece and Welfare frames provide a negative effect on EU 
attitudes vis-à-vis the non-treated baseline group, whereas the positive treatments all 
show a positive correlation with EU attitudes. One important difference, however, is that 
the Negative Culture frame surprisingly yields a significantly positive effect. Because this 
frame does not perform as expected, leaving the results hard to interpret, it is omitted 
from the analysis.  
Models 2 and 3 report the interaction effects between the country dummy and 
personality traits (Model 2) and the framing effects and personality traits (Model 3). To 
interpret these effects correctly (e.g., Brambor et al., 2005), I graph each interaction 
effect with 95% confidence intervals (graphs not reported). Although I do not find any 
significant moderating country effects, Denmark and Sweden nevertheless show different 
results. As reported in Figures 1 and 23, highly conscientious Swedes are slightly more 
EU positive vis-à-vis Danes, whereas the opposite relationship (in concordance with H5a) 
is true (see online appendix). Conversely, and contrary to my predictions in H4a, Figure 3 
illustrates that openness in Sweden is inversely correlated with positive EU attitudes. In 
Denmark, however, openness correlates positively with positive EU attitudes as 
predicted. I discuss these results later.   
 
 Finally, Model 3 reports on the interaction effects of the frames on personality 
traits. In Figures 3-15 below, I report the findings, in which the non-treated baseline and 
the treatment group yield different directional results with respect to their effect on EU 
attitudes. I report these findings because there is no significantly different effect between 
the treatment groups and the non-treated baseline in any of the interaction models.  
 
    (Figure 3-15)  
 
Figure 3-5 shows the interaction effects between the frames and extraversion. We see that 
H2b is partly verified in Figures 3 and 4, in which highly extraverted individuals are much 
more prone to alter their opinion after receiving the negative EU frames (i.e., Greece and 
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Welfare) than individuals ranking low on extraversion. Surprisingly, however, the 
positive Economy frame particularly affects individuals low on extraversion.  
Figures 6–9 report the findings on the moderated relationship between 
agreeableness and framing effects on EU attitudes. Hypothesis H6b is partly verified.  
The negative Greece and Welfare frames primarily affect individuals low on 
agreeableness, whereas they have a surprisingly minor positive effect on highly agreeable 
individuals. The actual framing content could offer an explanation. The negative Greece 
frame portrays the hardworking German vis-à-vis the lazy Greeks, whereas the Welfare 
frame emphasizes the different EU welfare regimes. Agreeable individuals rank highly on 
traits such as being sympathetic and warm. Hence, highly agreeable individuals may 
expose more cross-national solidarity and actually become more EU-positive when 
reminded about Greek fiscal problems or welfare inequality. Finally, Figures 8-9 shows 
that the positive Peace and Economy frames, in congruence with H6b, have a much higher 
positive effect amongst the highly agreeable.  
Figure 10 and 11 report on the interaction between conscientiousness and framing 
effects on EU attitudes. The framing effect reported is on two positive frames (i.e. Peace 
and Economy). Surprisingly, contrasting H5b, they show that less conscientious 
individuals are more impacted by the positive frames than highly conscientious 
individuals. This finding contradicts previous findings showing a positive relationship 
between conscientiousness and support for international cooperation and the EU (Bakker 
and Vreese, 2015, Schoen, 2007). One explanation may be that less conscientious 
individuals are also less politically conservative. They do not favor status quo to the same 
extent as the highly conscientious (Mondak, 2010). Hence, they might be more 
supportive of a strong union in a changed world, which is emphasized by the Peace and 
Economy frames. This interpretation adds nuance to the more general finding of a 
positive correlation between conscientiousness and EU attitudes.  
 Figures 12-15 show the findings of openness moderated by framing effects. In 
H4b, I expected that open individuals would be more influenced by frames, in general, and 
by positive frames, in particular. As seen, both the positive frames (i.e., Positive Political 
Culture and Economy) and the negative frames (i.e., Greece and Welfare) have a greater 
effect on open individuals vis-à-vis the non-treated baseline and individuals low on 
openness, confirming hypothesis H4b. Yet, both the positive and negative frames have a 
negative influence on open individuals. It is not obvious why this is the case, and none of 
the framing content offers an immediate explanation on this finding.  
In summary, whereas most frames interacting with personal predispositions did 
not yield any directional effect vis-à-vis the non-treated baseline, Figures 3-15 show that 
certain frames interacted with B5 traits predict EU attitudes. Although none of these 
effects are statistically significant, we nevertheless observe how personality traits affect 
framing effects and in most cases even reverse the framing effects from positive to 
negative, depending on the strength of the personality trait. Additionally, I did not find 
support for a negativity framing bias (H1). Of the 12 framing effects reported here 
(Figures 3-15), seven are negative frames, and six are positive frames. Table 54 in the 
online appendix summarises the findings and the hypotheses.  
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Discussion and conclusion: personality, framing effects and EU attitudes  
Research in EU attitudes has provided us with extensive knowledge about factors that 
play a role when forming opinions about the EU (e.g., Franklin et al., 1994, McLaren, 
2007, Boomgaarden et al., 2011, Hobolt, 2012, Hooghe and Marks, 2007, Karp et al., 
2003). This article adds to this work, exploring how personality play a role both as a 
moderating effect on different EU frames and as a direct effect on EU attitudes.   
I consistently identified the predicted direct positive relationships for 
extraversion, openness and neuroticism on EU attitudes. However, the uneven patterns of 
conscientiousness and agreeableness leave these results less consistent. Although these 
results confirmed the expected directional pattern, only a few were statistically 
significant. I discuss below to what extent these results resemble similar results and how 
they leave room for further research.  
 The findings of the interaction effects were more nuanced. Highly extraverted, 
open and agreeable individuals were more prone to alter opinions after receiving frames, 
in general. However, which frames they were affected by diverged. Extraverted and open 
individuals were primarily affected by negative frames, whereas agreeable individuals 
were particularly affected by positive frames. Furthermore, as expected, conscientious 
and neurotic individuals were less affected by framing effects, in general. However, less-
conscientious individuals were more influenced by positive EU frames than by negative 
frames, where the framing effects were as predicted for the least conscientious 
individuals. For neuroticism, I did not find any treatment effect vis-à-vis the non-treated 
baseline group. The nuances in framing effects according to personal predispositions 
indicate that framing effects indeed are asymmetrically perceived and are moderated by 
personal predispositions. Finally, I did not find that individuals were particularly 
influenced by negative frames.   
 
The study contributes to three sets of literature. First, it adds to the study of personality 
and politics, in general (e.g., Mondak, 2010, Mondak and Halperin, 2008, Carney et al., 
2008, Gerber et al., 2011), and European politics, in particular (Bakker and Vreese, 2015, 
Schoen, 2007). Second, it contributes to the study of framing effects, in general (e.g., 
Slothuus, 2008, Slothuus and Vreese, 2010, Druckman, 2001a) and their effect on EU 
attitudes, in particular (e.g., Lecheler and Vreese, 2010). Finally, the study contributes to 
the study of Euroscepticism (e.g., Usherwood and Startin, 2013), particularly in Denmark 
and Sweden (e.g., Lawler, 1997, Raunio, 2007).  
Personality affects political behaviour in various ways (e.g., Mondak, 2010, 
Hibbing et al., 2011, Carney et al., 2008, Schoen, 2007). Only one study examines the 
direct effect of personality on EU attitudes (Bakker and Vreese, 2015), although it is only 
on a Dutch sample, and only on the direct effect of personality traits and EU attitudes. It 
includes multiple parameters to measure EU attitudes. Here, I have one variable, which 
does not overlap with theirs. Hence, comparisons are limited. Still some similarities are 
prevalent. Both studies find a positive correlation between openness and agreeableness 
and EU attitudes and a negative association between neuroticism and EU attitudes. 
However, because their study includes more dependent variables, their findings are also 
more nuanced.  
Furthermore, although I found no significant country effects, minor differences 
existed between the two countries. For example, conscientious Swedes are slightly more 
positive towards EU integration, contrasting Denmark. The mixed findings on 
conscientiousness echo the mixed findings in the literature (Schoen, 2007, Bakker and 
Vreese, 2015). It is less obvious why there should be differences between Denmark and 
Sweden here. The findings on conscientiousness needs further research as both the direct 
effects and the interaction effects are inconclusive.  
Furthermore, open Swedes had an inverse relationship with positive EU attitudes; 
conversely, the open Danes lived up to the predicted positive view on EU integration. 
One explanation can be the differences between internationalism in Denmark and 
Sweden. Open individuals in neutral Sweden might be less EU supportive, whereas 
Denmark is characterized by active internationalism, emphasizing more EU integration.  
These discrepancies between the Danish and Swedish findings and the Dutch study 
justify more research on how differences in personality play a role cross-nationally in EU 
opinion formation. Such research should include additional dependent variables to tap the 
underlying dimensions of EU attitudes and more case countries to explore the 
generalizability of the results.  
The study also contributes to the literature on framing effects, emphasizing how 
media frames shape political behaviour (e.g., Zaller, 1992, Slothuus, 2008, Slothuus and 
Vreese, 2010, Druckman, 2001a). It adds to these studies by showing that open, 
extraverted and agreeable individuals are more inclined to receive framing effects, 
whereas neurotic and conscientious individuals are less inclined to do so. These 
tendencies are particularly pertinent in times of crisis. During the Eurozone crisis, media 
attention was dominated by negative conflict frames. The frames here tested are deduced 
from real-life media frames (Author’s own work). Thus, we are closer to understand how 
framing effects differ according to personal predispositions, and how these effects 
predicted EU attitudes during the Eurozone crisis. Knowing that anti-EU media discourse 
contributes to Euroscepticism (e.g., Abbarno and Zapryanova, 2013, Lecheler and 
Vreese, 2010), we can now add that framing effects differ according to personal 
predispositions, providing us with a better understanding of how framing effects affect 
EU opinion-formation in real life politics.  
Finally, this article contributes to the study of Euroscepticism. Recent decades’ 
focus on Euroscepticism provides multiple explanations on Euroscepticism (e.g., 
Anderson, 1998, Karp et al., 2003, McLaren, 2007, Usherwood and Startin, 2013). 
However, EU opinions are largely formed based on either positive or negative media 
content. Hence, framing effects are pertinent to include when exploring how people shape 
EU opinions. As we witnessed here, personal predispositions moderate framing effects 
and, thus, affect EU attitude formation. Furthermore, personal predispositions seem to 
determine to what extent individuals are responsive to framing effects at all. These 
findings provide insights into how personal predispositions may determine why certain 
individuals change attitudes during, for example, the Eurozone crisis, in which they are 
more heavily exposed to critical EU news. Future research could extend these results, 
investigating whether personal predispositions play a role in, for example, the low voter 
turnout in the European Parliament (i.e. the second order election debate, e.g. Reif and 
Schmitt, 1980).  
Context matters. Personality also depends on cultural context. Denmark and 
Sweden are extensive welfare states with high degrees of redistribution. Furthermore, 
they are known for soft Euroscepticism. As emphasized, these aspects could intervene 
with the findings presented here and affect the generalizability of the result across 
cultural contexts. Furthermore, I do not claim to have covered all relevant ways of 
framing the EU. Rather, I developed a set of identified EU frames in the Danish and 
Swedish debate in 2008-2013, highlighting negative and positive dimensions of EU 
integration. I call for further investigations, both as European integration evolves and in 
recognition that real-world EU politics is more complex than presented here, and because 
we would obtain a better grasp of the role of B5 traits by exploring the effects of different 
frames.  
Correlation is not causation. What I established here is correlation between certain 
psychological traits and their moderating and direct effects on EU attitudes. Thus, I 
emphasize that personality traits do not cause people to develop certain attitudes or 
perceive certain frames. Rather, the correlations and interaction effects are functions of 
an innate underlying inherited feature (Bakker and Vreese, 2015, p. 10-11). What we 
have witnessed here is that certain individual characteristics determine – in complex 
conjunction with media frames – how people perceive and feel about enhanced EU 
integration. Understanding what motivates political attitudes and how opinions are 
shaped is central to the study of EU integration. This article shows that personality 
matters and adds to our understanding of what shapes EU attitudes.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: Denmark and Sweden  
 
 
Country  Age (average) Gender (% 
female) 
Political left-right 
scale (average)  
Denmark  46.3 (15.61) 49 %  5.8 (2.47)  
Sweden  45.6 (15.52) 50 % 5.7 (2.42) 
Note: “Don’t know” answers missing. (N= 1808). Standard errors in parentheses.  
Source: Sweden and Denmark (2013)   
 
 
Table 2: Framing Wording and Response Distribution: Denmark and Sweden (percent)  
 
 
 
“The Euro has been challenged in the past years… “ Country  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Observations  
… “we often hear about how Greeks do not work as hard as, for 
example, Germans. On a scale from 0-10, to what extent do you think 
this is a problem? 0 indicates it is a big problem and 10 indicates it is 
not a big problem…” 
DK  37 18 23 5 7 1 8 0 1 0 87 
SE 43 14 10 1 9 9 7 4 2 0 90 
…“we often hear about welfare tourism, meaning the Danish welfare is 
threatened because EU citizens have access to welfare benefits like 
scholarships or unemployment benefits. (…)  
DK  37 15 8 5 10 3 4 6 2 10 100 
SE 20 8 9 8 15 6 8 3 1 22 100 
…“we often hear how political cultureal differences between the 
southern Mediterranean countries and the northern EU members are 
too big, particularly when it comes to the corruption and political 
scandals (…)  
DK 31 19 12 6 4 9 5 2 13 0 101 
SE  2 34 11 10 6 7 6 3 3 1 20 101 
…“yet the EU received the Nobel Peace Prize (2012)due to its 
contribution to peace since WW2. On a scale from 0-10, where 0 is “It is 
a peace project” and 10 is “it is not a peace project” please. indicate 
your attitude.”  
DK 10 13 10 9 10 5 7 11 1 25 101 
SE 9 9 7 9 17 7 11 8 2 20 99 
...“yet the cultural ties between the Member States are strong due to the 
common history” (…) 
DK 3 12 13 7 20 6 13 9 3 15 101 
SE 3 7 8 10 17 7 9 5 5 30 101 
…“yet the EU remains the world’s largest trading bloc, which is 
necessary to compete against global economies like China and 
India”(…)  
DK 12 12 9 3 7 4 6 7 7 33 100 
SE 10 9 4 3 12 3 3 11 4 40 99 
 
Note: “Don’t know” answers are missing (N= 1808) 
Source: Sweden and Denmark (2013)   
  
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for personality items: Denmark and Sweden   
 
 
Personality trait  Mean (std. dev.)  Denmark Mean (std. dev.) Sweden 
Openness  Conventional  3.51 (1.562) 3.34 (1.588) 
 Open  5.21 (1.245) 5.28 (1.298) 
Conscientiousness  Disorganised 2.87 (1.514) 2.95 (1.637) 
 Dependable  5.56 (1.206) 5.25 (1.371) 
Extraversion  Extroverted 4.75 (1.424) 5.37 (1.207) 
 Reserved  3.62 (1.663) 4.44 (1.634) 
Agreeableness  Critical  4.63 (1.559) 2.99 (1.632) 
 Sympathetic  5.33 (1.191) 5.64 (1.208) 
Neuroticism  Anxious  2.81 (1.511) 3.34 (1.589) 
 Calm  5.16 (1.296) 5.28 (1.298) 
 
Notes: “Don’t know” answers are missing (N= 1808). Standard deviation in parentheses.  
 
Source: Sweden and Denmark (2013)   
 
 
 
 
  
Table 4: Personality and attitudes towards EU integration*  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: *For the full model, including each of the interaction terms, pls. consult the online appendix.  
*** denotes significance p<0.01; ** denotes significance at p<0.05, and * denotes significance at p<0.1. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses clustered on regions in both countries.  “Don’t know” answers are missing 
(N= 1808). *= For the framing treatments (0= non-treated baseline group) 
Source: Sweden and Denmark (2013)   
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES  EU support EU support  EU support 
    
Extraversion 0.0281 0.0231 0.0913 
 (0.0246) (0.0153) (0.0918) 
Agreeableness  0.0189 0.0431 -0.0614 
 (0.0409) (0.0314) (0.0530) 
Conscientiousness 0.0186 -0.0150 0.0548 
 (0.0237) (0.0375) (0.0618) 
Neuroticism  -0.0947 -0.108 -0.118* 
 (0.0545) (0.0724) (0.0722) 
Openness  0.0206 0.0302 0.113 
 (0.0744) (0.0648) (0.0800) 
Country (0=Denmark)  0.419 0.290 
  (0.249) (0.147) 
Age    0.00873 
   (0.00438) 
Gender (0=female)   -0.00647 
   (0.187) 
Left Right Self-placement    -0.0545 
   (0.0400) 
Voted in EP election (0= voted)   0.0616 
   (0.142) 
Voted in national election (0=voted)   -0.273 
   (0.203) 
Greece *   -0.550 
   (0.294) 
Welfare     -0.0579 
   (0.845) 
Negative culture    0.931** 
   (0.297) 
Peace     0.0761 
   (0.516) 
Positive culture    0.0603 
   (0.524) 
Economy    0.154 
Constant  3.843*** (0.118) 4.118*** 
 (0.0752) (0.0895) (0.657) 
Observations 1.402 1,402 1,136 
R-squared 0.004 0.006 0.047 
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Table 5. Summary Table of hypotheses and findings  
   
Concept  Hypotheses  Results  
Negativity bias  H1: Negative frames affect EU opinions more strongly than positive frames.  
 
Not verified   
Extraversion H2a: Extraversion positively correlates with positive EU attitudes.  
 
Yes, verified. But not a significant 
relationship 
H2b: Extraverted individuals are more easily influenced by framing effects, particularly positive 
frames.  
 
Partly verified. Extraverted individuals more 
prone to change attitudes when receiving 
negative frames  
Neuroticism  H3a: Neuroticism inversely correlates with positive EU attitudes.  
 
Yes, significant relationship  (p<0.1) 
H3b: Neurotic individuals are less easily influenced on their EU attitudes. When influenced, 
they are more susceptible to negative frames.  
 
Yes, verified. Neuroticism is not influenced 
by framing effects  
Openness  H4a: Openness positively correlates with positive EU attitudes.  
 
Yes, verified. But not a significant 
relationship.  
H4b: Open individuals are more easily influenced by EU media frames, particularly positive 
frames.  
 
Yes, verified. Both positive and negative 
frames impact open individuals more 
Conscientiousness  H5a: Conscientiousness positively correlates with positive EU attitudes. 
 
Partly verified. Conscientiousness both 
correlates positively and negatively with EU 
attitudes  
H5b: Conscientious individuals are less influenced by EU frames. When influenced, they are 
susceptible to positive frames. 
Not verified. Less conscientious individuals 
are more impacted by positive frames  
 
Agreeableness  
 
H6a: Agreeableness positively correlates with EU attitudes. 
 
Partly verified. Agreeableness both 
correlates positively and negatively with EU 
attitudes 
H6b: Agreeable individuals are more influenced by positive EU frames.  
 
Partly verified. Positive frames affect 
agreeable individuals more, but negative 
frames influence low agreeable individuals 
more  
Country 
differences  
H7a: There are no significant differences between Denmark and Sweden, encompassing the 
direct or indirect effect of personality on EU attitudes.  
 
Yes, verified. No significant relationship 
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Figure 1: Interaction effects of country on the effect of conscientiousness on EU attitudes  
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Figure 2: Interaction effects of country on the effect of openness on EU attitudes  
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Figure 3: Interaction effects of Greece framing on the effect of extraversion on EU attitudes  
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Figure 4: Interaction effects of Welfare framing on the effect of extraversion on EU attitudes  
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Figure 5: Interaction effects of Economy framing on the effect of extraversion on EU attitudes  
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Figure 6: Interaction effects of Greece framing on the effect of agreeableness on EU attitudes  
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Figure 7: Interaction effects of Welfare framing on the effect of agreeableness on EU attitudes  
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Figure 8: Interaction effects of Peace framing on the effect of agreeableness on EU attitudes  
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Figure 9: Interaction effects of Economy framing on the effect of agreeableness on EU attitudes  
 
2
3
4
5
6
7
P
re
d
ic
te
d
 E
U
 s
u
p
p
o
rt
-6 6
Agreeableness
Economy Non-Treated
Adjusted Predictions with 95% CIs
 50 
 
Figure 10: Interaction effects of Peace framing on the effect of conscientiousness on EU attitudes  
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Figure 11: Interaction effects of Economy framing on the effect of conscientiousness on EU attitudes  
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Figure 12: Interaction effects of Greece framing on the effect of openess on EU attitudes  
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Figure 13: Interaction effects of Welfare framing on the effect of openess on EU attitudes  
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Figure 14: Interaction effects of Positive political culture framing on the effect of openess on EU attitudes  
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Figure 15: Interaction effects of Economy framing on the effect of openness on EU attitudes  
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